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TORTS- DEFAMATION- COMMENTS MADE WHILE PETITIONING A LEGISLATIVE BODY FOR A REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES ARE ABSOLUTELY PRIVILEGED. Sherrard v. Hull, 53
Md. App. 553, 456 A.2d 59, affdper curiam, 296 Md. 189, 460 A.2d 601
(1983).
While speaking before the Cecil County Board of Commissioners,
a county resident made allegedly defamatory remarks about a local
businessman. 1 In the subsequent suit for slander brought by the businessman, the court instructed the jury that if it found that the resident
was petitioning a legislative body for a redress of grievances, 2 then her
comments before the Board were absolutely privileged. 3 Upon the businessman's appeal from an adverse jury verdict, the Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland affirmed the trial court's instruction, holding that
statements made while petitioning a legislative body for a redress of
grievances are absolutely privileged. 4 The court of appeals affirmed
this holding in a per curiam opinion. 5
Courts generally recognize three types of absolute privileges applicable to comments made during governmental activities: 6 judicial privilege,7 legislative privilege, 8 and executive privilege. 9 Many jurisdicI. Sherrard v. Hull, 53 Md. App. 553, 555, 456 A.2d 59, 61, aff'dper curiam, 296 Md.

2.

3.
4.

5.
6.
7.

8.

9.

189, 460 A.2d 601 (1983). The resident implied that the businessman had bribed
one of the commissioners to obtain a change in the zoning designation of his
property.
This right is protected by the first amendment to the United States Constitution,
which provides in pertinent part that: "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging
. . . the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
Sherrard v. Hull, 53 Md. App. 553, 560, 456 A.2d 59, 63, affdper curiam, 296 Md.
189, 460 A.2d 601 (1983).
Id at 555, 456 A.2d at 61. An absolute privilege "protects the speaker or publisher without reference to his motives or the truth or falsity of the statement."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1077 (5th ed. 1979); if. "qualified privilege," infra note
15.
Sherrard v. Hull, 296 Md. 189, 460 A.2d 601 (1983) (per curiam).
See generally W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS§ 114 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited
as PROSSER].
E.g., Beeck v. Kapalis, 302 N.W.2d 90 (Iowa 1981); Sampson v. Rumsey, I Kan.
App. 2d 191, 563 P.2d 506 (1977); Abom v. Lipson, 357 Mass. 71, 256 N.E.2d 442
(1970); Feldman v. Bernham, 6 A.D.2d 498, 179 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1958); Bailey v.
McGill, 247 N.C. 286, 100 S.E.2d 860 (1957). Defamatory comments made by
judges, attorneys, parties, witnesses or jurors are absolutely privileged if the comments made are related to the matter before the court. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS §§ 585-89 (1977) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT]. English courts
afford an absolute privilege to these comments, whether or not related to the matter before the court. PRossER, supra note 6, at 778.
E.g., McGovern v. Martz, 182 F. Supp. 343 (D.D.C. 1966); Kohn v. Davis, 390 So.
2d 1246 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Abercrombie v. McClung, 55 Hawaii 595, 525
P.2d 594 (1974); Tocco v. Piersante, 69 Mich. App. 616, 245 N.W.2d 356 (1976).
Defamatory comments made by a legislator during the performance of his legislative functions are absolutely privileged. RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 590. The
absolute privilege also extends to statements by witnesses testif;ring at a legislative
proceeding, provided the statement is relevant to the proceedmg. Id § 590A.
E.g., Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959); Saroyan v. Burkett, 57 Cal. 2d 706, 371
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tions also recognize a privilege based on a citizen's right to petition the
government. 10
The right to petition the government for a redress of grievances,
preserved by the first amendment 11 and made applicable to the states
by the fourteenth, 12 derives from the Magna CartaY In the 1845 case
of White v. Nicholls, 14 the Supreme Court recognized a qualified privilege for statements made while petitioning the government. 15 In White,
a group of citizens sent letters to the President and the Secretary of the
Treasury impugning the character of a local customs official and requesting his removal from office. 16 The official sued the citizens for
libel, but the Supreme Court held that publications made while petitioning the government for a redress of grievances are qualifiedly
privileged. 17
Subsequent cases have also recognized an absolute 18 or qualified 19
privilege for comments made while petitioning. 20 Despite this case law
development, however, the petitioning privilege does not seem to have
gained the general acceptance that the judicial, legislative, and execu-

10.
11.
12.
13.

14.
15.
16.
17.

18.

19.

20.

P.2d 293, 21 Cal. Rptr. 557 (1962); Lucy v. Muchnok, 36 Pa. Commw. 272, 387
A.2d 945 (1978); Hackworth v. Larson, 83 S.D. 674, 165 N.W.2d 705 (1969); Gold
Seal Chinchillas, Inc. v. State, 69 Wash. 2d 828, 420 P.2d 698 (1966). Defamatory
comments by an executive or administrative officer, whether at the federal or state
level, are absolutely privileged, provided they are made while performing his official duties. RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 591.
See infra notes 18-19.
See supra note 2.
Hague v. Committee for Ind. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1004 (2d ed. 1983);
see also 1 C. STEPHENSON & F. MARCHAM, SOURCES OF ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 125 (2d ed. 1972); B. LYON, A CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL
HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 321 (2d ed. 1980).
44 U.S. (3 How.) 266 (1845).
ld at 287, 291. A "'qualified privilege' protects defendant from liability only if
he uttered defamatory statements without actual malice." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY lll7 (5th ed. 1979).
44 U.S. (3 How.) 266, 267-74 (1845).
ld at 287, 291. The precedential value of White's holding that the privilege is
only qualified is diminished by the fact that when the case was decided, the judicial, legislative, and executive privileges were also only qualified. ld at 287-89.
The latter three privileges are now held to be absolute. See supra notes 7-9.
E.g., Lininger v. Knight, 123 Colo. 213, 226 P.2d 809 (1951); Yancey v. Commonwealth, 135 Ky. 207, 122 S.W. 123 (1909); Weiman v. Mabie, 45 Mich. 484, 8
N.W. 71 (1881); Rainer's Dairies v. Raritan Valley Farms, 19 N.J. 552, 117 A.2d
889 (1955); Campo v. Rega, 79 A.D.2d 626, 433 N.Y.S.2d 630 (1980); Bloom v.
A.H. Robbins Co., 479 S.W.2d 780 (Tex. Civ. App.), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 983
(1972).
E.g., Pinn v. Lawson, 72 F.2d 742 (D.C. Cir. 1934); Ex parte Cypress, 275 Ala.
563, 156 So. 2d 916 (1963); Manley v. Harer, 82 Mont. 30, 264 P. 937 (1928);
Meyer v. Parr, 69 Ohio App. 344, 37 N.E.2d 637 (1941); State v. Kerekes, 225 Or.
352, 357 P.2d 413 (1960); Kent v. Bongartz, 15 R.I. 72, 22 A. 1023 (1885); McKee
v. Hughes, 133 Tenn. 455, 181 S.W. 930 (1916).
There is no clear majority or minority rule as to whether the petitioning privilege
is absolute or qualified. See 50 AM. JuR. 2D Libel and Slander§ 217 (1970); 53
C.J.S. Libel and Slander§ 116 (1948).
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tive privileges enjoy. 21
During the 1960's and early 1970's the Supreme Court bolstered
the right to petition in a trilogy of cases.22 The Court found an absolute petitioning privilege that insulates certain conduct from the operation of antitrust laws. This principle, known as the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine, permits companies to associate for the purposes of influencing
the government or obtaining governmental action, when such an association for other purposes would violate the antitrust laws. 23 Even if
the companies' intent in petitioning the government is to eliminate
competition, their activities are still protected from prosecution under
antitrust laws. 24 The rationale for this doctrine has two components.
First, the government, in order to act on behalf of the people, must
have free access to information, since "the whole concept of representation depends upon the ability of the people to make their wishes known
to their representatives." 25 Second, a construction of the antitrust laws
that would punish petitioning the government would violate the first
amendment right to petition.26
The Noerr-Pennington doctrine will not, however, protect conduct
found to be a "sham." 27 Thus, under the "sham exception," conduct
that is merely an effort to prevent competitors from gaining similar access to the government, 28 or that subverts the integrity of the governmental process through corrupt means or misrepresentations,29 is not
privileged.
Over the last decade a number of courts have applied the NoerrPennington doctrine to other areas of law, extending an absolute privilege to petitioning activity that would otherwise be actionable. 30 As in
21. For example, a discussion of the petitioning privilege is conspicuously absent
from the Second Restatement of Torts. RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, §§ 583-612.
22. These cases applied the privilege to the petitioning of all three branches of government. California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508,
510-ll (1972) (judicial); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670
(1965) (executive); Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight,
Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 135-36 (1961) (legislative).
23. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. at 510-ll; Pennington, 381 U.S. at 670; Noerr, 365
U.S. at 139-40.
24. Pennington, 381 U.S. at 670.
25. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 137.
26. Id at 137-38.
27. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. at 511; Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144.
28. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. at 512; Israel v. Baxter Laboratories, Inc., 466 F.2d
272, 279 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
29. Federal Prescription Serv., Inc. v. American Pharmaceutical Ass'n, 663 F.2d 253,
266 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 928 (1982); United States v. American
Tel. & Tel. Co., 524 F. Supp. 1336, 1362 (D.D.C. 1981).
30. E.g., Gorman Towers, Inc. v. Bogoslavsky, 626 F.2d 607 (8th Cir. 1980) (claim
under the federal Civil Rights Act that defendants obtained a zoning change to
prevent plaintiffs from building on the property); Missouri v. National Org. for
Women, Inc., 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir.) (tortious infliction of economic harm without legal excuse), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842 (1980); Feminist Women's Health
Center, Inc. v. Mohammad, 586 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1978) (tortious interference
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the Noerr-Pennington antitrust cases, many of these courts determined
that the importance of protecting the right to petition outweighs any
possible harm to the plaintiffs. 31
In the 1981 case of Webb v. Fury, 32 the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals extended Noerr-Pennington to the defamation area.
In Webb, a coal company sued an environmental group for libel. The
allegedly defamatory communications consisted of the environmental
group's filing administrative complaints against the company with two
federal agencies, and the group's publishing a newsletter accusing the
company of polluting the environment. 33 The West Virginia court held
that since both the administrative complaints34 and the newsletter3 5
were efforts to influence governmental activity, they were protected by
an absolute petitioning privilege. Until Sherrard v. Hu//, 36 Webb was
the only case to apply the Noerr-Pennington doctrine to a defamation
case.
In Sherrard, the court of special appeals noted that Maryland
courts generally follow the common law concerning defamation privileges,37 recognizing the judicial, 38 legislative, 39 and executive40 privileges.41 Until Sherrard, however, no Maryland court had addressed the

31.

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

39.
40.
41.

with a business relationship), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 924 (1979); Weiss v. Willow
Tree Civic Ass'n, 467 F. Supp. 803 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (conspiracy to harass and
delay plaintiffs' application for zoning permits in violation of their civil rights);
Sierra Club v. Butz, 349 F. Supp. 934 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (tortious interference with
an advantageous relationship); City of Long Beach v. Bozek, 31 Cal. 3d 527,645
P.2d 137, 183 Cal. Rptr. 86 (1982) (suit by a municipal government for malicious
prosecution); Matossian v. Fahmie, 101 Cal. App. 3d 128, 161 Cal. Rptr. 532
(1980) (malicious prosecution, tortious business interference, and abuse of
process).
See, e.g., Missouri v. National Org. for Women, Inc. 620 F.2d 1301, 1317 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842 (1980); Sierra Club v. Butz, 349 F. Supp. 934, 939
(N.D. Cal. 1972); City of Long Beach v. Bozek, 31 Cal. 3d 527, 535-36, 645 P.2d
137, 141, 183 Cal. Rptr. 86, 90-91 (1982).
282 S.E.2d 28 (W. Va. 1981).
/d. at 31-33.
/d. at 37.
/d. at 41-42.
53 Md. App. 553, 456 A.2d 59, affdper curiam, 296 Md. 1S9, 460 A.2d 601 (1983).
Sherrard, 53 Md. App. at 556-58, 456 A.2d at 61-63.
E.g., Gersh v. Ambrose, 291 Md. 188, 434 A.2d 547 (1981); Adams v. Peck, 288
Md. 1, 415 A.2d 292 (1980); DiBlasio v. Kolodner, 233 Md. 512, 197 A.2d 245
(1964); Brinsfield v. Howeth, 107 Md. 278, 68 A. 566 (1908); Picone v. Talbott, 29
Md. App. 536, 349 A.2d 615 (1975).
Brush-Moore Newspapers v. Pollitt, 220 Md. 132, 151 A.2d 530 (1959) (dicta);
Maurice v. Worden, 54 Md. 233 (1880); Law v. Scott, 5 H. & J. 359 (1822).
Walker v. D'Alesandro, 212 Md. 163, 129 A.2d 148 (1957).
One significant departure from the majority of American courts is Maryland's
adoption of the "English Rule" regarding the judicial privilege afforded to witnesses' comments. Under this rule, any defamatory statements are absolutely
privileged, whether or not they are relevant to the matter before the court. E.g.,
Gersh v. Ambrose, 291 Md. 188, 434 A.2d 547 (1981); Korb v. Kowaleviocz, 285
Md. 699,402 A.2d 897 (1979); Schaub v. O'Ferrall, 116 Md. 131, 81 A. 789 (1911);
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issue of whether a petitioning privilege exists in defamation cases. 42
In deciding this issue, the court first determined that the county
resident's appearance before the Board of Commissioners did not come
within the scope of either the judicial or legislative privileges. 43 The
judicial privilege was found inapplicable because the Board was not
exercising judicial functions. 44 The court, unsure of the "contours of
the [legislative] privilege in a particular factual situation," also declined
to apply that privilege to the facts before it. 45
Having held the established privileges inapplicable, the court next
addressed the petitioning privilege. It held that a privilege does exist in
defamation cases for comments made while petitioning a legislative
body for redress, 46 basing its holding on three grounds. The court first
noted that the right to petition the government is one of the oldest and
"most precious" of the liberties preserved by the Constitution. 47 The
court also reviewed the policy behind the privilege, and found that the
promotion of free communication between the government and its citizens is vital in a democratic society.48 Finally, the court recognized
that the right to petition has been protected in the antitrust area by the
Supreme Court through the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, 49 and that this
protection has been extended by other courts to various causes of action, 50 including defamation. 5 1 The adoption of a petitioning privilege
would, therefore, be in line with a trend toward expanding the scope of
this privilege, and would recognize the important role it plays in safeguarding one's rights in a democratic society. 52
The court further determined that the petitioning privilege should
be absolute, rather than qualified. 53 The court noted the split of authority on this issue 54 and recognized that many jurisdictions have
adopted a qualified petitioning privilege. 55 The court determined, however, that the cases holding the privilege to be qualified were decided
before the development of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, or were dis-

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Hunckel v. Voneiff, 69 Md. 179, 14 A. 500 (1888). The majority of American
courts follow the "American Rule." See PRossER, supra note 6.
52 Md. App. at 555, 456 A.2d at 61.
/d. at 556-58, 456 A.2d at 62-63.
/d. at 558, 456 A.2d at 62.
/d., 456 A.2d at 62-63.
/d. at 555, 456 A.2d at 61.
/d. at 561, 456 A.2d at 64 (quoting United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar
Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967)).
/d. at 573, 456 A.2d at 70-71.
/d. at 561-63, 456 A.2d at 64-65; see supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text.
Sherrard, 53 Md. App. at 563-64, 456 A.2d at 65; see supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
Sherrard, 53 Md. App. at 564-65, 456 A.2d at 66; see supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
Sherrard, 53 Md. App. at 573-74, 456 A.2d at 70-71.
/d. at 567, 456 A.2d at 67.
/d. at 568-70, 456 A.2d at 68-69.
/d. at 569-70, 456 A.2d at 68-69; see supra note 19.
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tinguishable in that they did not relate to the direct petitioning of a
legislative body. 56 This fact, coupled with both the "evolution" of the
petitioning privilege under Noerr-Pennington, and the importance of
protecting the free flow of information to the government, 57 led the
court to hold the privilege to be absolute.
The Sherrard court also adopted the "sham exception" 5 8 to the petitioning privilege. 59 The exception was held inapplicable, however,
since there was no indication that the county resident "was attempting
to interfere with the business relationships" of the plaintiff. 6 ° Furthermore, the resident's allegedly defamatory remarks were merely incidental to her appearance before the Board; she was addressing the
Board in order to obtain governmental action and not simply to pervert
the process in an effort to slander the plaintiff. 61
The petitioning privilege adopted by the court of special appeals in
Sherrard v. Hull is a logical addition to the law of defamation. Since
comments made by participants in judicial and legislative functions enjoy an absolute privilege, the same privilege should apply to petitioning, which is another form of participation in governmental activities.
Furthermore, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine and its subsequent expansion constitute an express recognition of the importance of and the
need to protect the right to petition.
However, Sherrard v. Hull, as do most precedent-setting cases,
leaves a few questions unanswered. The court provides no definition of
what kinds of activity constitute petitioning, 62 simply implying that
whether conduct is petitioning is a question of fact for the jury. 63 Thus,
future participants in governmental activities have little guidance as to
what conduct will be protected.
The scope of the "sham exception" also remains undefined. The
court found the exception inapplicable in Sherrard, but did not indicate
whether the exception should be broadly or narrowly construed. 64 The
strong interest in protecting the right to petition indicates that the exSherrard, 53 Md. App. at 572, 456 A.2d at 69.
Id, 456 A.2d at 69-70.
See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
Sherrard, 53 Md. App. at 565, 456 A.2d at 66.
Id at 566, 456 A.2d at 67.
Id
Cases from other jurisdictions applying the petitioning privilege involve several
different types of activity and hence offer no definitive guidelines. See supra notes
18-19.
63. Sherrard, 53 Md. App. at 573, 456 A.2d at 70.
64. For arguments in favor of both a broad and a narrow application of the "sham
exception" see Note, Antitrust- Supreme Court Extends Noerr Immunity from
Sherman Actio Allempls to Influence Adjudication, 76 DICK. L. REv. 593, 603-05
(1972) (narrow construction); Note, California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking
Unlimited: A New Route for Noerr-Pennington and the Sham Exception 26 Sw.
L.J. 926, 933 (1972) (broad construction).

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
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ception will be narrowly construed. 65 Since, however, the petitioning
privilege was held to be absolute the "sham exception" is the only
means by which a defamed party can recover damages. 66 Despite these
unresolved questions, the adoption of the petitioning privilege in a
"well-reasoned opinion" 67 is a logical and needed addition to defamation law.
Michael A. Duff

65. The court's statement that first amendment rights need "breathing space" to survive would indicate that Maryland courts will in the future construe the exception
narrowly. Sherrard, 53 Md. App. at 567, 456 A.2d at 67.
66. See supra note 4.
67. Sherrard v. Hull, 296 Md. 189, 189, 460 A.2d 601, 601 (1983).

